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Abstract 
This article explains the link between mortgages insured by government agencies 
and the underlying house price, in both Canada and the United States of America (USA). 
Overall, American states with fewer insured mortgages relative to all mortgages 
originated experience a larger real estate price decline during an economic downturn 
despite a lower concentration of risky consumers in those areas.  
Canadian mortgage insurance data is virtually unavailable although over 50 
percent of all residential mortgages are insured in Canada. Canadian insurance data, 
provided by the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), is sparse and 
does not allow for as in-depth of an analysis of mortgage insurance in the Canadian 
market versus that of the USA. 
Proposed regulations will make mortgage insurance harder to obtain and may 
actually strengthen the Canadian real estate market. Unfortunately, the CMHC has 
refused to release valuable mortgage insurance data and a thorough analysis cannot be 
conducted. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: real estate market, home price, mortgage insurance, Canadian Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation (CMHC), Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Farm Service 
Agency (FSA), Rural Housing Service (RHS), Veterans Affairs (VA). 
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Executive Summary 
As the turmoil of the financial crisis begins to dissipate, the effects of mortgage 
insurance on the real estate market and the greater economy have come under increased 
scrutiny by the government, academics, and the general public alike. Mortgage loan 
insurance is an insurance policy that compensates the lender or investors for losses in the 
event of a default on a mortgage loan. Policy holders typically pay a premium as a 
percentage of the total loan value and this premium is normally added to the principal of 
the loan, effectively leading to a small premium with each mortgage payment over the 
amortization period. Consumers obtain the insurance under regulation or use it to qualify 
for mortgages at interest rates comparable to those offered to buyers with larger down 
payments. For millions of North Americans, this type of insurance is an important 
consideration that will effect their decision to buy a home. 
 In Canada, consumers interested in purchasing a home with a high ratio loan, that 
is a loan-to-value ratio less than 80%, must obtain mortgage insurance by federal law. 
Most individuals obtain insurance from the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation 
(CMHC) which is a crown corporation of the Government of Canada and is the country’s 
national housing agency. The CMHC contributes to the stability of the housing market 
and financial systems, provides support to Canadians in housing need, and offers 
objective housing research and advice to Canadian governments, consumers and the 
housing industry.  
In the United States, there are four government entities that back mortgage loans 
for individuals wishing to buy a home with a high-ratio mortgage: Federal Housing 
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Administration (FHA); Farm Service Agency (FSA); Rural Housing Service (RHS); and 
Veterans Affairs (VA). FHA-insured loans are considered a type of federal assistance and 
have historically allowed low-income Americans to borrow money for the purchase of a 
home that they would not otherwise be able to afford. 
After identifying the amount of loans that are insured for various American states, 
the ratio of mortgage insurance had a moderate effect on the decrease in home prices 
during the period between 2007 and 2011. American states with fewer government-
backed insured mortgages relative to all mortgages underwritten saw larger price declines 
when compared to areas with high volumes of insured mortgage loans. Areas with lower 
volumes of insured loans encompass individuals who are less risky but experience a 
higher level of real estate price volatility. 
Although the Canadian market shares some similarities to the American market, 
Canada’s availability and transparency of mortgage loan information pales in 
comparison. In America, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) is a 
federal law that requires certain financial institutions to provide mortgage data to the 
public. As such, a number of details on millions of mortgages are made available each 
year. In Canada, there is a similar act that is broader in nature because it relates to the 
transparency of all government entities. The Access to Information Act of 1985 states that 
public information should be made available to the public with limited and specific 
exemptions and decisions on whether to disclose government information should be 
made independently of government. Even though the CMHC is bound by the Access to 
Information Act, they’re representatives refuse to make important mortgage information 
available to the public.  
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1: Literature Review 
Researchers explore the link between lending and asset markets under the 
assumption that asset-backed loans are mispriced, either rationally or irrationally. In the 
last decade, research has identified the impact of aggressive lending on real estate. Pavlov 
and Wachter (2004) found that underpricing of the default risk in bank lending leads to 
inflated asset prices in markets of fixed supply. Hung and Tu (2006) found that the 
increase in the median home price in California is associated with the increased use of 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2004, p. 81) 
also suggested that countries with higher use of ARMs have a more volatile real estate 
market. Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) identify real estate price inflation by 
comparing the theoretically estimated price to the observed market price. Pavlov and 
Wachter (2011) distinguish themselves from Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai’s argument 
by developing an observable implication and mechanism for a specific cause of asset 
price changes and potentially, a credit-induced bubble. They found both theoretically and 
empirically, that the presence of aggressive lending instrument magnifies real estate 
market cycles. Specifically, markets with high concentrations of aggressive lending 
instruments are at risk of relatively larger price declines following a negative demand 
shock. In addition, Pavlov and Wachter (2011) found that markets with the most decline 
following a negative demand shock tend to suffer greater withdrawal of aggressive 
lending. 
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 According to Herzog (2009), rising housing demand during the early 1900’s made 
way for the development of a number of private mortgage insurance companies. Today 
almost all of them have gone bankrupt or ceased writing new policies, highlighting an 
ongoing concern within the American housing market. The National Housing Act of 1934 
created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which was established primarily to 
increase home construction, reduce unemployment, and operate various loan insurance 
programs (www.fha.gov).  
There are four government-entity loan insurance programs currently in existence: the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured; the Farm Service Agency (FSA)-
guaranteed; the Rural Housing Service (RHS)-guaranteed: the Veterans Affairs (VA)-
guaranteed. Typically, borrowers who utilize this type of insurance make less than a 20% 
down-payment and typically pay a premium either upfront, or it is amortized into the 
total amount of the loan.  
 Since mortgage insurance reduces the risk to the lender, borrowers may qualify 
for mortgages with interest rates comparable to those offered with larger down payments, 
therefore making mortgage insurance attractive to the consumer. Deng and Gabriel 
(2005) analyze the competing risks of FHA mortgage termination, specifically, the 
release of collateral when a mortgage is paid in full. They found that elevated default 
risks of loans originated among lower credit quality and minority borrowers are more 
than offset by the damped prepayment speeds of those loans, so as to result in markedly 
lower termination probabilities amongst underserved borrowers. In addition, they also 
found that pooling and risk-based pricing of FHA-insured mortgages can substantially 
reduce housing finance costs among underserved borrowers, which advances their home 
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ownership opportunities. At the same time, Pavlov and Wachter (2011) found that when 
some borrowers see their borrowing constraint relaxed, asset prices increase; if loans are 
underpriced, this effect is magnified. 
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2: Data & Analysis 
2.1 Data 
2.1.1 USA 
This empirical analysis uses state-level insured share of total mortgage 
originations from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). For the purposes of this 
research, all types of insured or guaranteed mortgages were considered. Annual data from 
2006 & 2007 was used as a proxy for the period preluding the financial crisis and any 
loan data missing a geographical location was removed from the data set, accounting for 
a loss of 1,437,368 mortgage originations or 3.27% of the total loan volume. In total, 
43,997,265 mortgage originations from 2006 and 2007 with a total value of 
$8,497,053,695,000 USD were used to determine the state-level insured mortgage ratios.  
Home price data was downloaded from the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA) website (www.fhfa.gov) for 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
Home Price Index (HPI) data is a weighted, repeat-sales index and it measures average 
price changes in repeat sales or refinancing of the same properties. 
American state-level Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and personal income data 
was downloaded from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (bea.gov). GDP and personal 
income data for Puerto Rico was obtained from the World Bank database 
(www.data.worldbank.org/country/puerto-rico). This analysis utilized per capita real 
GDP total percent increase/decrease as a control measure for the regression analysis. It 
also utilized per capita income total percent increase/decrease as a robustness measure for 
the regression analysis.  
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2.1.2 Canada 
Home price data was downloaded from the Teranet and National Bank of Canada’s 
website (www.housepriceindex.ca). The Teranet-National Bank House Price Index 
(TNBHPI) is and independent representation of the rate of change of Canadian single-
family home prices based on the property records of public land registries. The TNBHPI 
covers eleven Canadian metropolitan areas including Victoria, Vancouver, Calgary, 
Edmonton, Winnipeg, Hamilton, Toronto, Ottawa, Montréal, Québec and Halifax. 
Historical information for the total value of insured mortgages in Canada was 
downloaded from Statistics Canada’s website (www.statscan.gc.ca, CANSIM Table 176-
0014). 
The CMHC currently has very little data available by province and almost no data 
is available by specific geographical regions as it pertains to mortgage loan insurance 
information. They provide a number of statistics with regards to housing starts, 
completions and rental data, however, mortgage loan insurance information is sparse. The 
only relevant source of mortgage loan insurance information can be found within the 
Mortgage Loan Insurance Business Supplement.  There are several issues with this 
document: first, the report was only initiated in three years ago and as a result records 
only go as far back as 2013, and it is limited in its analysis of longitudinal economic 
trends. Key data metrics are missing and those that are available are only provided on a 
national level, for example, loan-to-value ratios are not broken down into provincial 
segments, and the entire report’s most refined geographical area is at the provincial level. 
This document does not disclose the loan volume amounts as an exact number, but only 
as a rough estimate. In essence, the only corporation to provide mandatory insurance for 
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consumers with less than a 20% initial deposit does not disclose how much business is 
does in each region of Canada. 
With this in mind, Robyn Adamache, a Market Analyst at the CMHC Vancouver 
office, was first contacted and an information request was made for a more refined loan 
insurance data set of the British Columbia market. The request was denied. Richard Cho, 
a Market Analyst at the CMHC Calgary office, was then contacted with the same request 
for Alberta. The request was denied. As an entity of the government, the CMHC is bound 
by The Access of Information Act (1985). According to the Access to Information Act, 
information should be made available to the public with limited and specific exemptions 
and decisions on whether to disclose government information should be made 
independently of government. Both representative refused to provide information and 
they repeatedly refused any compromise with regards to the geographical refinement of 
the data. As such, Angèle Legault, the Access to Information and Privacy Officer at the 
CMHC, was contacted and a formal request was submitted under the Access to 
Information Act.  The request was redirected to David D’Amour, Director of Q.A. and 
Business Analytics at the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Insurance, and the 
request was denied. According to David, “The CMHC is unable to accommodate the 
request. (The) CMHC is in the process of considering what additional information can 
and should be provided to the public as part of our planning and prioritizing for 2017.” 
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2.2 Methodology 
 
This research closely follows that of Pavlov and Wachter (2011) and their work 
on Subprime Lending and Real Estate Prices. 
2.2.1 USA 
 
Mortgage insurance information was obtained from HMDA and the total insured 
mortgage ratio for each state were determined as a percent dollar volume of insured 
mortgage loans compared to all mortgages originated in that state (Table 1). Ratios were 
determined for each state and average insured ratios were calculated by averaging values 
from 2006 and 2007. FHA-insured, FSA-guaranteed, RHS-guaranteed and VA-
guaranteed were all considered insured mortgages. 
Quarterly HPI data was obtained from FHFA and the total percent return from 
2007 – 2011 was used. This timeframe represents the beginning of the housing decline 
during the financial crisis to the bottom of the national housing market (Figure 1). During 
this period, the value of the US housing market dropped by almost 13% on average. 
Additionally, total percent return from 2011 – 2015 was used to represent the upturn as 
the US housing market rose on average by 15.5% during this period (Table 2).  
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The Insured Mortgage Ratios and Total Percentage Decreases were analyzed 
using a cross-sectional regression for each timeframe. In addition, per capita GDP was 
introduced into the regression analysis as a control variable and per capita personal 
income was used to analyze robustness. 
Figure 1 HPI of American States from 2000 – 2015 (Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency) 
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2.2.2 Canada 
HPI data was collected from Teranet-National Bank House Price Index and a total 
percent return for the period from 2000 to 2015 was calculated (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Total Annual Return of Major City (Source: Teranet-National Bank House Price Index) 
 
 Since provincial mortgage loan insurance data could not be obtained from the 
CMHC, even though a formal request was submitted under the Access to Information Act, 
mortgage insurance ratios for Canadian regions could not be calculated. 
Nationally, the mortgage insurance ratio is substantially higher in Canada when 
compared to America, hovering just above 50% of all residential mortgages (Figure 3). In 
addition, there was a sharp increase in the national insurance rate in 2010 to 2012 from 
43% to 60% respectively.  From 2012 onward, there is a decreasing trend that could be 
amplified by new mortgage insurance regulations in 2016. 
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Figure 3 Canadian National Insured Mortgage Ratio for Residential Mortgages (Source: Statistics 
Canada, CANSIM Table 176-0014) 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 USA 
After analysing the insured mortgage ratio and total percent decline from 2007 to 
2011, an apparent trend emerged.  States on the east and west coast had a significantly 
lower amount of insured mortgages relative to all mortgages underwritten (Figure 7). In 
addition, states with fewer insured mortgage loans relative to all mortgages underwritten 
experienced larger negative decreases during the recession (Figure 4). This suggests that 
mortgage insurance plays a stabilizing effect on the real estate market. For example, 
Nevada had fewer than 4% of total mortgages insured and experienced nearly a 48% 
decrease whereas Alaska had almost 18% of total mortgages insured and experienced less 
than a 1% decrease during the same timeframe. From the regression analysis (Table 3) a 
moderate positive correlation is evident between the insured mortgage ratio and the total 
percent return.  
Figure 4 Insured Mortgage Ratio vs. Total % Return from 2007 to 2012 
The correlation coefficient value of 0.5677 highlights the strength of the 
relationship; about 32% of the variation in home price return can be explained by the 
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mortgage insurance ratio. The insured mortgage ratio is significant as an explanatory 
variable with a p-value of 0. In addition, the regression outputs with GDP & personal 
income per capita confirms the results (Table 4 & 5). 
Figure 5 Insured Mortgage Ratio vs. Total % Return from 2012 to 2015 
 
 After analyzing the insured mortgage ratio and total return during the housing 
upturn, it seems that states with a lower insured mortgage ratio experience a higher return 
during the upswing whereas states with higher insured mortgage ratios saw a lower 
relative return highlighting the stabilizing effect of mortgage insurance (Figure 5). For 
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 From the regression analysis (Table 6) a weak to moderate correlation is evident 
between the insured mortgage ratio and the total percent return during the economic 
upturn between 2011 and 2015. The correlation coefficient value of 0.2951 highlights the 
weak-strength of the relationship with about only 9% of the variation in home price 
return being explained by the mortgage insurance ratio. The insured mortgage ratio can 
be considered significant as an explanatory variable with a p-value of 0.03. In addition, 
the regression outputs with GDP & personal income per capita confirms the results 
(Table 7 & 8). 
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2.3.2 Canada 
When comparing the total annual return of both the American and Canadian 
markets from 2000 to 2015, a moderate pattern appears.  
 
Figure 6 Total % Return of Canada and US HPI (Sources: Teranet-Nation Bank HPI & FHSA HPI) 
 
With a correlation of 0.5, it is no surprise that the two markets share some similarities, 
though there are several important differences (Figure 6). The Canadian real estate 
market has been view as the model for the G7 countries during the financial crisis as 
Canadian banks were able to weather the storm that brought down several large financial 
institutions around the globe. Even though the necessary data is not available to conduct a 
thorough analysis, effects similar to the American real estate market may be present in 
Canada especially if specific areas experience a decrease in total insured loan volume. 
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3: Conclusion 
3.1 Implication for the USA 
This article demonstrates how the absence of mortgage insurance magnifies real 
estate market cycles in America. States with low concentration of mortgage insurance are 
at risk of relatively larger price declines following a negative demand shock. This finding 
is consistent with the prevalence of aggressive instruments and deregulation that enables 
the relaxation of the borrowing constraint and in turn magnifies the effects of negative 
demand shocks. Furthermore, markets with the lowest concentration of insured mortgage 
loans experienced the largest declines. 
Since mortgage insurance acts as a real estate market cycle stabilizer, the latest 
increase in insured mortgages underwritten could signal a stronger and more stable real 
estate market in America. 
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3.2 Final Remarks and Implications for Canada 
The Canadian Real Estate Market has proved its relative strength during the 
recent financial crisis when compared America, however, the availability of mortgage 
insurance data is somewhat lacking in Canada. 
The Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) is Canada’s National 
housing agency and they help millions of Canadians meet their housing needs by offering 
mortgage loan insurance with a minimum down payment that can be as low as 5% 
(www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca). 
Although over $540,000,000 in loan volume was insured in 2015, the CMHC 
only provides national data on key metrics and have refused to provide more information 
by province or major city. A request under the Access of Information Act was submitted 
and denied by three separate departments. As an entity of the government, the CMHC is 
bound by the Access to Information Act, though, their representatives were unwilling to 
release this type of information. 
New mortgage insurance rules take effect in 2016 as high ratio loans submitted 
for mortgage insurance must be qualified using the Mortgage Rate Stress Test, and the 
CMHC has new eligibility requirements for low ratio loans. Both these measures stand to 
decrease the total amount of loans underwritten and may actually amplify the effects of a 
negative demand shock in specific Canadian regions. 
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3.3 Research Limitations 
The absence of mortgage insurance information currently available in Canada 
makes it impossible to perform any meaningful regression analysis. Although the CMHC 
was contacted several times and an access to information request was processed, 
ultimately no data was provided. 
The Canadian market is much smaller than our American neighbours and current 
home price indices do not cover all transactions across all regional areas. Only 
transactions from major city centres are included and this is used as a proxy for the entire 
province. This lack of availability sharply contrasts the American market where 
transaction data from all regions is readily available online and specific transaction data 
can be obtained at a cost. 
In both the American and Canadian markets, information on homes purchased 
with cash is extremely hard to obtain. In Canada, fears about inflated markets in 
Vancouver and Toronto are amplified with the influx of international investment. Even 
though recent regulation has attempted to dampen the negative effects of foreign 
investment on the housing market, future impacts may still emerge. 
 Even though the American real estate market is similar to the Canadian market, 
there are some distinct differences. Not only are there more private mortgage insurers in 
America but American citizens can also deduct interest expense on their mortgage 
payment even if it is their primary residence. In Canada, however, individuals cannot 
deduct mortgage interest expense on their primary home and can only do so with 
additional investment properties. 
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3.4 Future Research 
In America there is ample information available on every mortgage originated. 
The public has access to data including nationality, race and after tax income just to name 
a few. All of these aspects can and should be studied further to identify possible impacts 
on home prices. Also, the geographical differences between counties and states can be 
looked into more rigorously to discover any patterns or asset price implications. 
Although an access to information request was denied by the CMHC, there are 
two additional mortgage insurers in Canada who deal primarily with the secondary 
market. Genworth Canada and Canada Guaranty may be more willing to provide 
necessary information to the Canadian public and should be contacted for further 
research. Additionally, as time passes more historic information will be available from 
the CMHC’s Mortgage Insurance Business Supplement report and this will open the door 
to additional research. Unfortunately, waiting years for more information to become 
available is not ideal. 
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Appendix A: Regression Data 
Table 1 Insured Mortgage Ratio by State (Source: HMDA) 
State Abbreviation State Name Insured Mortgage Ratio 
AK Alaska 16.78% 
AL Alabama 8.36% 
AR Arkansas 12.15% 
AZ Arizona 3.86% 
CA California 0.57% 
CO Colorado 7.08% 
CT Connecticut 4.34% 
DC District of Columbia 1.41% 
DE Delaware 5.78% 
FL Florida 3.16% 
GA Georgia 8.05% 
HI Hawaii 3.06% 
IA Iowa 6.37% 
ID Idaho 5.59% 
IL Illinois 4.15% 
IN Indiana 9.79% 
KS Kansas 9.00% 
KY Kentucky 8.97% 
LA Louisiana 6.79% 
MA Massachusetts 2.24% 
MD Maryland 4.89% 
ME Maine 4.16% 
MI Michigan 6.80% 
MN Minnesota 3.94% 
MO Missouri 7.25% 
MS Mississippi 10.03% 
MT Montana 6.37% 
NC North Carolina 7.12% 
ND North Dakota 11.54% 
NE Nebraska 8.12% 
NH New Hampshire 2.98% 
NJ New Jersey 4.85% 
NM New Mexico 7.09% 
NV Nevada 3.61% 
NY New York 2.69% 
OH Ohio 8.91% 
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OK Oklahoma 11.40% 
OR Oregon 3.54% 
PA Pennsylvania 4.63% 
PR Puerto Rico 12.52% 
RI Rhode Island 3.12% 
SC South Carolina 5.15% 
SD South Dakota 8.58% 
TN Tennessee 8.61% 
TX Texas 10.03% 
UT Utah 5.87% 
VA Virginia 5.27% 
VT Vermont 2.41% 
WA Washington 4.41% 
WI Wisconsin 4.70% 
WV West Virginia 6.02% 
WY Wyoming 7.61% 
 
Table 2 Total % Return, 2007-12 & 2012-15 (Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency) 
Region 2007-2011 HPI Total Return 2011-2015 HPI Total Return 
Alaska -0.72% 9.93% 
Alabama -8.32% 5.56% 
Arkansas -5.64% 6.56% 
Arizona -40.09% 43.01% 
California -35.91% 36.49% 
Colorado -7.97% 37.91% 
Connecticut -15.69% -0.38% 
District of Columbia -6.58% 35.43% 
Delaware -17.23% 4.02% 
Florida -37.22% 36.91% 
Georgia -19.73% 14.92% 
Hawaii -16.01% 26.29% 
Iowa -0.50% 8.83% 
Idaho -24.55% 24.98% 
Illinois -18.71% 6.18% 
Indiana -5.70% 9.41% 
Kansas -2.98% 8.01% 
Kentucky -2.97% 8.76% 
Louisiana -2.51% 10.22% 
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Massachusetts -10.89% 15.42% 
Maryland -23.13% 6.99% 
Maine -11.00% 7.06% 
Michigan -23.12% 21.47% 
Minnesota -17.50% 17.57% 
Missouri -9.52% 6.67% 
Mississippi -7.31% 6.00% 
Montana -7.68% 15.04% 
North Carolina -11.01% 10.91% 
North Dakota 9.80% 32.55% 
Nebraska -1.03% 14.53% 
New Hampshire -16.66% 7.19% 
New Jersey -17.95% 6.70% 
New Mexico -12.98% 2.94% 
Nevada -48.88% 59.11% 
New York -11.49% 6.19% 
Ohio -10.00% 9.48% 
Oklahoma 0.16% 11.31% 
Oregon -24.10% 35.12% 
Pennsylvania -7.38% 5.33% 
Puerto Rico -11.55% -11.17% 
Rhode Island -21.35% 8.38% 
South Carolina -9.96% 8.54% 
South Dakota 1.35% 15.93% 
Tennessee -6.86% 11.79% 
Texas -1.43% 27.32% 
Utah -19.48% 22.06% 
Virginia -14.40% 9.19% 
Vermont -4.32% 3.17% 
Washington -23.36% 29.05% 
Wisconsin -9.95% 4.58% 
West Virginia -5.08% 8.51% 
Wyoming -4.03% 11.59% 
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Table 3 Regression Output: Insured Mortgage Ratio vs. Total Return during Downturn (2007-2011) 
 
 
Table 4 Regression Output: Insured Mortgage Ratio & Per Capita GDP vs. Total Return during Downturn 
(2007-2011) 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.5677
R Square 0.3223
Adjusted R Square 0.3088
Standard Error 0.0930
Observations 52
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.2055                 0.2055 23.7807 0.0000              
Residual 50 0.4321                 0.0086 
Total 51 0.6376                 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept (0.25)             0.03                     (8.75)    0.00        (0.31)                 (0.20)           
Insured Mortgage Ratio 1.98               0.41                     4.88      0.00        1.17                   2.80             
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.7628          
R Square 0.5818          
Adjusted R Square 0.5648          
Standard Error 0.0738          
Observations 52
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.3710               0.1855 34.0878 0.0000              
Residual 49 0.2666               0.0054 
Total 51 0.6376               
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept (0.27)             0.02                   (11.72)  0.00        (0.32)                 (0.23)          
Insured Mortgage Ratio 1.11               0.36                   3.10      0.00        0.39                   1.84            
GDP per Capita 0.79               0.14                   5.51      0.00        0.50                   1.07            
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Table 5 Regression Output: Insured Mortgage Ratio & Per Capita Income vs. Total Return during 
Downturn (2007-2011) 
 
Table 6 Regression Output: Insured Mortgage Ratio vs. Total Return during Upturn (2011-2015) 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.2972
R Square 0.0883
Adjusted R Square 0.0511
Standard Error 0.1273
Observations 52
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.0769 0.0384 2.3735 0.1038
Residual 49 0.7937 0.0162
Total 51 0.8706
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.22               0.04                     5.00   0.00      0.13                   0.31             
Insured Mortgage Ratio (1.29)             0.64                     (2.01) 0.05      (2.58)                 0.00             
Per Capita Income 0.09               0.34                     0.26   0.80      (0.59)                 0.76             
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.2951          
R Square 0.0871          
Adjusted R Square 0.0688          
Standard Error 0.1261          
Observations 52
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.0758                 0.0758 4.7697  0.0337              
Residual 50 0.7948                 0.0159 
Total 51 0.8706                 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.23               0.04                     5.77      0.00      0.15                   0.31             
Insured Mortgage Ratio (1.20)             0.55                     (2.18)    0.03      (2.31)                 (0.10)           
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Table 7 Regression Output: Insured Mortgage Ratio & Per Capita GDP vs. Total Return during Upturn 
(2011-2015) 
 
Table 8 Regression Output: Insured Mortgage Ratio & Per Capita Income vs. Total Return during Upturn 
(2011-2015) 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.3975          
R Square 0.1580          
Adjusted R Square 0.1236          
Standard Error 0.1223          
Observations 52
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.1375                 0.0688 4.5965  0.0148              
Residual 49 0.7331                 0.0150 
Total 51 0.8706                 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.13               0.06                     2.15      0.04      0.01                   0.25             
Insured Mortgage Ratio (0.86)             0.56                     (1.53)    0.13      (1.99)                 0.27             
GDP per Capita 0.57               0.28                     2.03      0.05      0.01                   1.13             
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.5718          
R Square 0.3270          
Adjusted R Square 0.2995          
Standard Error 0.0936          
Observations 52
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.2085                 0.1042 11.9015 0.0001              
Residual 49 0.4291                 0.0088 
Total 51 0.6376                 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept (0.23)             0.06                     (4.08)    0.00        (0.34)                 (0.11)           
Insured Mortgage Ratio 1.96               0.41                     4.76      0.00        1.13                   2.79             
Per Capita Income (0.17)             0.29                     (0.58)    0.56        (0.74)                 0.41             
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Appendix B: Geographical Data 
 
 Figure 7 Insured Mortgage Ratio by State (Source: HMDA) 
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 Figure 8 2007-2011 HPI Total % Return 
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 Figure 9 2011-2015 HPI Total % Return
 28 
 
Works Cited 
Deng, Yongheng and Gabriel, Stuart. 2005. Are Underserved Borrowers Lower Risk? 
New Evidence on the Performance and Pricing of FHA-Insured Mortgages. Lusk Center 
for Real Estate. University of Southern California. 
 
Herzog, Thomas N. 2009. History of Mortgage Finance with an Emphasis on Mortgage 
Insurance. Copyright 2009 by Society of Actuaries. 
 
Himmelberg, C., C. Mayer and T. Sinai. 2005. Assessing High House Prices: Bubbles, 
Fundamentals, and Misperceptions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19: 67-92 
 
Hung, S. and C. Tu. 2006. An Examination of House Price Appreciation in California 
and the Impact of Aggressive Mortgage Products. California State University-East Bay: 
Hayward, CA. 
 
International Monetary Fund. 2004. World Economic Outlook: The Global Demographic 
Transition. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs 
 
Mishler Lon and Cole, Robert E. 1995. Consumer and Business Credit Management. 
Homewood, Illinois: Irwin. pp. 118-121. 
 
Pavlov, A. and S. Wachter. 2004. Robbing the Bank: Short-term Players and Asset 
Prices. The Journal of Real Estate Economics 28: 147-160. 
 
Pavlov, A and S. Wachter. 2011. Subprime Lending and Real Estate Prices.                              
The Journal of Real Estate Economics 39: 1-17 
  
 29 
 
CMHC Contact Information 
Robyn Adamache 
Principle, Market Analysis (Vancouver, British Columbia) 
radamache@cmch-schl.gc.ca 
604-737-4120 
 
Richard Cho 
Principle, Market Analysis (Calgary, Alberta) 
rcho@cmch-schl.gc.ca 
403-515-2996 
 
Angèle Legault 
Access to Information and Privacy Officer 
atip-aiprp@cmch-schl.gc.ca 
613-748-2501 
 
David D’Amour 
Director, Q.A. and Business Analytics 
Office of the Senior Vice-President, Insurance 
ddamour@cmhc-schl.gc.ca 
613-748-2325 
 
